





In a simple portfolio choice model of two assets a foreign exchange
transactions tax is implemented. We show that the graph in the ¹-¾2-
range is still a parabola and delineate its characteristics for altering
tax rates. We presumed a risk avers investor seeking to minimize
investment risks by international diversiﬁcation of two uncorrelated
assets. The main ﬁnding is that setting up a portfolio under the new
tax condition leads to a higher transaction volume on international ﬁ-
nancial markets. In contrast, the transactions tax has got a stabilizing
character when adjusting the portfolio to increased foreign investment
risks.
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The outbreak of ﬁnancial crises and monetary turmoil in some developing
countries in the 1990s has given reason to the so-called globalization debate.
Above all, critics hold the tremendous transaction volume on internationale
ﬁnancial markets responsible for the erroneous trend of these economies.
Asymmetric information and herd behavior of investors, pulling in and out
huge amounts of money within seconds, misguide international capital ﬂows
and thus having negative impact on concerned economies. Transactions taxes
are said to be one way out and are put forward as a political measure to di-
minish globalization risks.
A tax on foreign exchange transactions should make foreign investments more
expensive dependent on the time of holding the foreign asset. Thus, the To-
bin Tax - named after its ﬁrst proposer James Tobin in 19781 - discriminates
short term investments against investments of longer holding periods. There
exists a broad literature about the Tobin Tax discussing the pros and cons
in respect of its desirability, eﬀectiveness, and feasibility2.
In his model Frankel (1996) shows mathematically that the tax burden goes
contrary to the holding period of the foreign asset. He concludes that the To-
bin Tax is an incentive not to trade foreign exchange that often, and therefore
the transaction volume on the foreign exchange market will decline. Assets
are assumed to yield a ﬁxed return or at least an expected interest rate ne-
glecting any risk. In addition to Frankel (1996), and also Stiglitz (1989),
Summers/Summers (1989) and Eichengreen/Tobin/Wyplosz (1995), who re-
vive Tobin‘s arguments for putting sand in the wheels of ﬁnancial markets,
1See Tobin (1978).
2An overview oﬀers Haberer (2003).
1most contributions to the Tobin Tax discussion do not focus on portfolio
decisions3. In this paper we will examine how a forex transactions tax af-
fects the portfolio choice. Our framework is based on Markowitz’s pioneering
ﬁndings of the 1950s, in which a (representative) investor’s decision is based
on the expected return and the risk of the portfolio4.
This article is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 explains the model with its assumptions and deﬁnitions. Our
analysis takes place in chapter 3. In 3.1 the portfolio possibilities curve and
the eﬃcient frontier are deﬁned. Presuming a very risk averse investor we
concentrate on the minimum variance portfolio in chapter 3.2 and will do
some comparative static analysis in 3.3 for the case of uncorrelated assets.
Chapter 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
Our framework is a two-country-model. In the home country as well as in
the foreign country there is only one risky asset available. Extending the
model to n assets available in many countries would be unessentially more
complex, since it does not oﬀer any additional insights, and we have the
possibility to show the eﬀects of taxation graphically in the ¹-¾-range. Since
always residual risks of default and inﬂation remain, and moreover foreign
3Most cited papers are that of Arestis/Saywer (1997), Bird/Rajan (2001), Davidson
(1997), Davidson (1998), De Grauwe (2000), Dooley (1996), Goodhart (1996), Lyons
(1997), Menkhoﬀ/Michaelis (1993) and Palley (1999).
4About the portfolio choice theory see Elton/Gruber (1995).
2investments face exchange rate risk we except riskless lending and borrowing5.
Let r1 be the return of the domestic asset with the variance ¾2
1, and r2 the
return of the foreign asset with the variance ¾2
2, then ¯ r1 > 0 is the expected
return of the domestic asset, ¯ r2 > 0 of the foreign asset respectively. A1 is the
fraction invested in the home asset, A2 the fraction invested in the foreign
country’s asset (net, without tax payment).
Then the return of the portfolio r can be written as
r = A1r1 + A2r2 ¡ (1 ¡ A1)T: (2.1)
T denotes the foreign exchange transactions tax modelled as a withholding
tax, which is due only at the time of buying foreign currency6.
From equation 2.1 we get the expected return of the portfolio ¹r as
¹r = A1¯ r1 + A2¯ r2 ¡ (1 ¡ A1)T: (2.2)
The side condition is A1 + A2 + (1 ¡ A1)T = 1 or rather
A2 = (1 ¡ T)(1 ¡ A1) (2.3)
what means that the fractions invested in the two assets and the tax payment
must sum up to 1.











2 + 2¾12A1A2 (2.4)
5The investment behavior of a manager of a fond of one industrial sector gives us
another rational for the exclusion of riskless lending and borrowing. Such a portfolio only
consists of risky assets of pharmaceutics e.g. and does not involve ”riskless” ﬁnancial
assets like government bonds.
6The Tobin Tax proposal is a transactions tax due at the point of buying and selling the
foreign currency. In the sense of Haberer (2003) - in contrast to Frankel (1996) - equation
2.1 should be r = A1r1+A2r2¡(1¡A1)T ¡A2(1+r2)T. But to avoid complexity without
losing any insight we model the transactions tax to be due only once.
3with ¾12 as the covariance between the returns of the two assets.
It is assumed that the representative investor is risk avers and makes up his
mind only on the basis of the expected portfolio return ¹r and the variance ¾2
r.
According to the home bias that can be justiﬁed by asymmetric information
amongst the domestic and the foreign country, we assume the risk of the






Since the investor is risk avers, he will only take more risk if he expects a
higher return, and thus
¯ r2 > ¯ r1: (2.6)
3 Analysis
In this chapter we want to analyze the eﬀects of the transactions tax on
investor’s portfolio choice. At ﬁrst, we develop the possibilities curve in the
¹r-¾2
r-range before determining the minimum variance portfolio. By doing
some comparative static analysis we ﬁnd out in chapter 3.3 that a transac-
tions tax might increase the transaction volume on international ﬁnancial
markets after imposing the tax.
3.1 The Possibilities Curve
Having implemented a transactions tax into a standard portfolio choice model
in the previous chapter we now want to illustrate the set of all ¹r-¾2
r-combinations
of the portfolio return that are possible. Moreover we will show graphically
4in this chapter how this possibilities curve or opportunity set will behave
against the tax rate. For risk averse investors we will detect dominated port-
folios so that we can expose an eﬃcient frontier.
Equation 2.3 applied to equation 2.2 and solved for A1 and A2 yields
A1 =
¹r + T ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T)




(¯ r1 ¡ ¹r)(1 ¡ T)
¯ r1 ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T) + T
: (3.8)
Equations 3.7 and 3.8 plugged into 2.4 gives us an expression for the variance
¾2
r dependent on the expected return ¹r and the exogenous variables T,
¾2
1, ¾2
2, ¾12 and the asset returns r1 and r2. Substituting A, B and D for
expressions of the exogenous variables (see appendix A1), we can rewrite the
variance ¾2
r against the return ¹r as follows:
¾
2
r = A(¹r ¡ B)
2 + D: (3.9)
Equation 3.9 is that of a parabola in the ¹r-¾2
r-range.
Figure 3.1 shows the possibilities curve for the case of uncorrelated assets
(¾12 = 0) with a transactions tax of 1 per cent7. P1 is the portfolio if only
asset 1 is bought, P2 is the portfolio if only asset 2 is bought. M is the min-
imum variance portfolio. All combinations of assets on the ascending part
of the parabola dominate the portfolios below, since higher returns with the
7In ﬁgure 3.1 and 3.2 all the other parameters are constant in their values: ¯ r1 = 0:05,
¯ r2 = 0:10, ¾2
1 = 0:25 and ¾2
2 = 0:5.














Figure 3.1: The Possibilities Curve and its Eﬃcient Frontier.















Figure 3.2: The Possibilities Curve with Diﬀerent Tax Rates.
6same risk can be realized. Thus, the eﬃcient frontier is situated between M
and P2 if short-selling is not allowed or it is the total ascending part of the
curve, if short-selling is allowed (default in asset 1).
Figure 3.2 shows the possibilities curve with altering tax rates from 0 per cent
to 3 per cent. As we can see, the parabola gets narrower with increasing tax
rates. No matter of the tax rate, P1 can be reached in every case in contrast
to P2, which can be realized only in the case of T = 0. Another ﬁnding from
the graphic is, that the minimum variances become smaller with increasing
tax rates.
3.2 The Minimum Variance Portfolio
The attractiveness of international ﬁnancial markets is that of diversifying
risk internationally. As we can see from the graphics in the previous chapter
there exist always eﬃcient portfolios of lower risk than that of one single
asset even for uncorrelated assets. The minimum variance portfolio is that
combination of assets, in which risk can no longer be reduced by diversiﬁ-
cation. The objective function is equation 2.4 with the side condition 2.3.




















7must be satisﬁed in the minimum variance portfolio. From condition 3.11








1 ¡ (1 ¡ T)¾12
; T 6= 1: (3.14)
Together with equation 3.13 we get the expressions for the fractions invested
in the two assets to minimize the portfolio risk:
A1min =
(1 ¡ T)[¾2
2(1 ¡ T) ¡ ¾12]
(1 ¡ T)[¾2





1 ¡ (1 ¡ T)¾12]
(1 ¡ T)[¾2
2(1 ¡ T) ¡ 2¾12] + ¾2
1
: (3.16)
The tax payment T(1 ¡ A1min) is given by
T(1 ¡ A1min) =
T[¾2
1 ¡ ¾12(1 ¡ T)]
(1 ¡ T)[¾2
2(1 ¡ T) ¡ 2¾12] + ¾2
1
: (3.17)
We now have delineated the possibilities curve, the eﬃcient frontier and
the minimum variance portfolio as the optimal choice for an very risk avers
investor, who wants to minimize his portfolio risk by international diversiﬁ-
cation. In the following section we want to examine the impact of changes
in the tax rate on the investor’s portfolio choice.
3.3 A Comparative Static Analysis
We now turn to the ceteris paribus analysis of the investment decision. We
ﬁrst examine the optimal adjustment when the transactions tax is introduced
or the tax rate changes. Note that these ﬁndings hold for portfolios set up
8after imposing the tax, since only capital ﬂows and not capital stocks are
taxed. In the last part we study how a transactions tax governs the portfolio
choice of the investor when foreign investment risks change.
Most of the ﬁndings refer to a situation of uncorrelated assets. We argue for
that restriction as follows:
3.3.1 Uncorrelated Assets
The ratio of the fractions invested in the two assets in the risk minimum is


















1 ¡ (1 ¡ T)¾12]2 · 0: (3.18)
½12 is the correlation coeﬃcient between the returns of the two available
assets and is given by ½12 = ¾12=¾1¾2 and therefore in the range between -1
and +1. The ratio of the fractions does not change for perfectly correlated
assets, thus ½12 = §1. The smaller the correlation the higher the impact
on the ratio. In the case of uncorrelated assets, the change of the tax rate
inﬂuences the investor’s decision at most.
Moreover, the clue of the portfolio theory is the reduction of the portfolio
risk by diversiﬁcation even in the case of uncorrelated assets. It is clear-cut
that risk can be reduced by buying negatively correlated assets or by buying
and short-selling positively correlated assets, but the more interesting case
is that of ½12 = 0.
Another reason for examining a portfolio of uncorrelated assets is based on
9the fact that most of the investors do not sell short. Partially short-selling
is forbidden by law. This means that diversiﬁcation must be done under the
constraint
A1min ¸ 0 and A2min ¸ 0: (3.19)
Therefore the condition









must be fulﬁlled (see appendix A2). This holds always for ½12 = 0 whatever
the variances of the two assets are.
3.3.2 Adaptation Process After the Tax Levy
















To examine how the fraction invested in the domestic assets must be rear-
ranged due to changes of the transactions tax rate we take the ﬁrst derivative









1]2 < 0: (3.23)
This expression is negative since the denominator is positive and all terms
of the numerator are positive as well (T < 0). This means that the fraction,
10which the representative investor invests in the domestic assets, decreases
with rising tax rates.
The tax payment given by T(1 ¡ A1min) behaves as follows:
@[T(1 ¡ A1min)]
@T




This derivative with respect to the tax rate is positive because the last term
as seen above is negative and A1min is smaller than 1 since we exclude short-
selling. Thus, the rise of the tax rate increases the tax payment.
The much more interesting issue is the optimal adjustment of the foreign












Whether this expression is positive or negative depends on the term in square
brackets. As we can see, each parameter is positive and squared so that we
can take the square root. For all combinations of the variances solving
(1 ¡ T)¾2 > ¾1 (3.26)
the equation 3.25 is positive. Condition 3.26 is fulﬁlled for ¾2 > ¾1 as we
have already presumed (see condition 2.5) and small values of T what is rec-
ommended by actual literature about the foreign exchange transactions tax.
Therefore, against all ﬁndings and persuasions of the proponents of the To-
bin tax, in this simple framework of portfolio choice a transactions tax on
the foreign exchange market would raise the fraction invested in the foreign
11asset by the representative investor. The transaction volume on the foreign
exchange market would increase quite after imposing the tax or changing the
tax rate.
The rational for the raise of the foreign fraction runs as follows: The tax pay-
ment on foreign exchange transactions distorts the investor’s optimal portfo-
lio by reducing the fraction of foreign assets. To reach the optimal ratio after
changing the tax rate, the investor has to remargin into the foreign asset in
order to minimize the portfolio risk.









































1] < 0: (3.29)
Since all terms on the right hand side are positive, the derivative is negative.
Thus, a raise of the tax rate results in lower portfolio risk after adjusting
the portfolio. The transactions tax can be regarded as an riskless asset with
negative return. Since the investor’s objective is to minimize the portfolio
risk and the portfolio adjustment results from exalting the foreign fraction,
the tax levy lowers the portfolio risk.
12One might rashly think that this risk reduction goes inevitably with lower
return. The portfolio return in the variance minimum is given by
¹r;min = A1min¯ r1 + A2min¯ r2 ¡ (1 ¡ A1min)T
= A1min(¯ r1 + T) + A2min¯ r2 ¡ T: (3.30)





































2(¯ r1 + T)
1 ¡ T
: (3.32)
That means that for extrem values of the foreign return8 and a much more
higher risk of the foreign investment, not only can the portfolio variance be
reduced by adjusting the optimal portfolio, but also may the expected return
be increased.
The question that rises immediately is why the risk averse investor does not
hold back a certain amount of money and does invest it in a riskless asset
like the tax payment in our case but with a positive return. The answer is
clear-cut: In our model we excluded riskless lending and borrowing from the
set of available assets and thus the tax payment is the only riskless tool but
with negative return.
8In the case of imminent ﬁnancial crises very high returns are expected.
133.3.3 Changing Foreign Investment Risks
In the previous chapter we examined the adjustment of a portfolio set up
under the new tax condition. In this chapter we study how the investor
behaves when the investment risk in the foreign country rises e.g. due to
political or economic turmoil.








A change of the return risk of asset 2 in the foreign country inﬂuences the
optimal fraction according to the ﬁrst derivative of equation 3.33 with respect










2(1 ¡ T)2]2 < 0: (3.34)
This derivative is negative what means, that a higher foreign risk leads to
smaller investments in the foreign country. What we want to know is how a
transactions tax inﬂuences this restructuring of the portfolio. Therefore we











2(T ¡ 1)2]3 > 0: (3.35)
This derivative is positive, since T is smaller than 1. The conclusion is the
following:
A higher tax rate raises the ﬁrst derivative of the foreign fraction with respect
to the assumed foreign risk. Since this derivative (equation 3.34) is negative,
14its value approximates 0 what means that the restructuring of the portfolio
under transactions taxes is lower, since less money will be pulled out of the
foreign country, if foreign investment risk goes up.
4 Summary and Conclusions
In this article we examined the eﬀect of transactions taxes on the investor’s
portfolio choice. We concentrated on the case of two uncorrelated assets, one
available in the home country and the other in a foreign country. Short-selling
was not allowed. We found out, that the opportunity set in the ¹r-¾2
r-range is
still a parabola with its eﬃcient frontier at the ascending part. We presumed
a very risk averse investor reaching to minimize risks. Only in the case of
totally correlated assets the ratio between the fractions are independent from
the tax rate. Otherwise decreases the investment in the domestic asset with
increasing tax rate. Uncorrelated assets assure that diversiﬁcation without
short-selling one asset takes place.
We distinguished two examinations: The portfolio adjustment due to the tax
levy or changing tax rates, and the adaptation due to changes in assumed
investment risks. For low tax rates the fraction invested in the foreign as-
set would increase by adjusting the portfolio due to the tax levy. Hence,
as a temporary eﬀect of adjustment the transaction volume on the foreign
exchange market would increase and is the opposite eﬀect of what the pro-
ponents of the Tobin tax intend. The transactions tax lowers the portfolio
risk without necessarily lowering the return. In contrast, a transactions tax
has a stabilizing eﬀect when the investment risk abroad increases, since the
fraction of the foreign asset would be shifted less to adjust the portfolio.
15Further research would be generalizing the approach to correlated assets,
introducing a speciﬁc utility function of the representative investor to char-
acterize his risk aversion and allow riskless lending and borrowing.
16Appendix
A1
To delineate the possibilities curve we take the expressions for the two frac-
tions (equations 3.7 and 3.8)
A1 =
¹r + T ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T)
¯ r1 ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T) + T
and
A2 =
(¯ r1 ¡ ¹r)(1 ¡ T)
¯ r1 ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T) + T
















[¹r + T ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T)]2¾2
1
[¯ r1 ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T) + T]2
+
[(¯ r1 ¡ ¹r)(1 ¡ T)]2¾2
2
[¯ r1 ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T) + T]2
+ 2¾12
[¹r + T ¡ ¯ r2(1 ¡ T)][(¯ r1 ¡ ¹r)(1 ¡ T)]



















2 + ¯ r
2
2(1 ¡ T)
2 + 2¹rT ¡ 2¹r¯ r2(1 ¡ T) ¡ 2T¯ r2(1 ¡ T)]
+ 2¾12(1 ¡ T)[¡¹
2
r + ¹r(¯ r1 ¡ T + (1 ¡ T)¯ r2) + T¯ r1 ¡ (1 ¡ T)¯ r1¯ r2]g:
Since we want to display ¾2

















1¯ r2(1 ¡ T) + ¾
2
2(1 ¡ T)




2 + ¯ r
2
2(1 ¡ T)






+ 2¾12(1 ¡ T)¯ r1[T ¡ (1 ¡ T)¯ r2]g: (A.1)
We deﬁne the term following ¹2






2 ¡ 2¾12(1 ¡ T)





1¯ r2(1 ¡ T) + ¾
2
2(1 ¡ T)
2¯ r1 ¡ ¾12(1 ¡ T)(¯ r1 ¡ T + (1 ¡ T)¯ r2




























r ¡ 2¹rB + C]
= A[¹r ¡ B]
2 + A(C ¡ B
2)
= A[¹r ¡ B]
2 + D (A.2)
with
D = A(C ¡ B
2):
Equation A.2 is a parabola in the ¹r-¾2
r-range.
19A2
The condition for real diversiﬁcation without short-selling is equation 3.19:
A1min ¸ 0 and A2min ¸ 0:
Together with equations 3.15 and 3.16 it yields
(1 ¡ T)[¾2
2(1 ¡ T) ¡ ¾12
(1 ¡ T)[¾2




1 ¡ (1 ¡ T)¾12]
(1 ¡ T)[¾2
2(1 ¡ T) ¡ 2¾12] + ¾2
1
¸ 0:




2(1 ¡ T) ¸ ¾12 and ¾
2
1 ¸ (1 ¡ T)¾12:
The last conditions divided by ¾1¾2 and with ½12 =
¾12
¾1¾2 can be rewritten as









and is always fulﬁlled for ¾12 = 0.
This condition includes that the collective denominator (1 ¡ T)[¾2
2(1 ¡ T) ¡
2¾12] + ¾2
1 is positive, because solving for 2¾12 and dividing by ¾1¾2 gives
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